Efficient quantum cryptography network without entanglement and quantum
  memory by Li, Chun-Yan et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
70
5.
17
48
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
2 M
ay
 20
07
Efficient quantum cryptography network without entanglement and quantum memory∗
Chun-Yan Li1,2, Xi-Han Li1,2, Fu-Guo Deng1,2,3†, Ping Zhou1,2, Yu-Jie Liang1,2, Hong-Yu Zhou1,2,3
1 The Key Laboratory of Beam Technology and Material Modification of Ministry of Education,
Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875
2 Institute of Low Energy Nuclear Physics,
and Department of Material Science and Engineering,
Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875
3 Beijing Radiation Center, Beijing 100875
(Dated: May 30, 2018)
An efficient quantum cryptography network protocol is proposed with d-dimension polarized pho-
tons, without resorting to entanglement and quantum memory. A server on the network, say Alice,
provides the service for preparing and measuring single photons whose initial state are |0〉. The users
code the information on the single photons with some unitary operations. For preventing the un-
trustworthy server Alice from eavesdropping the quantum lines, a nonorthogonal-coding technique
(decoy-photon technique) is used in the process that the quantum signal is transmitted between
the users. This protocol does not require the servers and the users to store the quantum state and
almost all of the single photons can be used for carrying the information, which makes it more
convenient for application than others with present technology. We also discuss the case with a
faint laser pulse.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Preventing a vicious eavesdropper, say Eve from steal-
ing the message in communication is one of the most
important issues nowadays. In the classical communica-
tion, the security of the public key crypto-systems is gen-
erally based on their computational complexity. For ex-
ample, the security of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman public
key scheme [1] depends on the difficulty of factoring a
large integer. Up to now, none of them has been proven
to be unconditionally secure. The Vernam one-time pad
crypto-system [2] provides a secure way for two remote
parties to communicate with a private key which is re-
quired to be long as the message and can only be used
one time securely. As a classical signal is in one of the
eigenvectors of a operator, it can be copied fully and
freely. Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [3, 4] provides a secure way for creating a
private key between two authorized users, and becomes
one of the most important applications of quantum in-
formation [3, 4]. For instance, Bennett and Brassard
[5] presented an original QKD protocol, called BB84,
with four nonorthogonal single-photon states in 1984 ,
and Ekert [6] introduced a QKD protocol based on the
correlation of a maximally entangled two-particle quan-
tum system, an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR) pair in
1991. Now, there is much attention focused on QKD
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. It has been also well devel-
oped in experimental implementations [4].
In recent years, the any-to-any QKD protocols for
the secure communication on a passive optical network,
which is a requirement of practical implementations, have
been studied by some groups [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
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Phoenix et al. [13] proposed a multi-user QKD scheme
with single photons in 1995 following the ideas in Ben-
nett 1992 protocol [8] and BB84 QKD protocol [5]. In
this scheme, half of the quantum information carriers
(QIC) are useful for carrying the information if they re-
move the ideas from BB84 QKD. Its efficiency for qubits
ηq ≡ quqt = 50%, the same as that in BB84 QKD.
Here qu is useful qubits and qt is total qubits used. In
1997 Townsend [14] demonstrated the multi-user QKD
(MUQKD) on an optical fiber networks with faint laser
pulses following the ideas in BB84 QKD [5]. Biham et al.
[15] proposed a MUQKD protocol with quantum mem-
ories in 1996. In their MUQKD scheme, no more than
1
8 QIC can be used as the qubits for the raw key. The
advantage is that the users on the network can work with-
out quantum channels if they store the QIC in the quan-
tum memories in advance [15]. Xue et al [16] presented a
way for MUQKD using the mixture of single photons and
EPR pairs as the QIC. The efficiency ηq was improved to
approach 100% with the ideas in Ref. [9]. Another two
MUQKD schemes [17, 18] were presented by modifying
the quantum dense coding [20] and the point-to-point
QKD protocol proposed by Long and Liu [10]. In these
two MUQKD schemes, the QIC are EPR pairs. More-
over, their efficiency ηq is improved to approach 100%
only when the users or the servers on the network ex-
ploit quantum memory to store the QIC. Although the
technique of quantum storage is a vital ingredient for
quantum information and there has been a great deal of
interests in developing it [21], it cannot be used in the
practical application at present.
In this Letter, we will introduce a new multi-user QKD
network protocol without resorting to entanglement and
quantum memory. The d-dimensional single photons are
prepared and measured by the server Alice on the net-
2work with one measuring basis (MB). The users code
the information on the single photons with some unitary
operations, and each photon can carry log2d bits of infor-
mation. Almost all the photons can be used to carry the
useful information, the efficiency for qubts ηq approaches
100%. The users can exploit some decoy photons (in
nonorthogonal states) which are obtained by operating
some samples with a Hadamard operation to ensure the
security of the quantum communication. We also discuss
this multi-user network with a faint laser pulse. 
 
  
UB 
Measurement 
Sender 
0
 
Quantum signals 
A B CU U U= ⊗
 
Alice 
Server 
D1 
D2 
PNS 
PNS 
UC 
Receiver 
D3 
D4 
Charlie 
Bob 
PNS 
 
FIG. 1: The subsystem of the network in this MUQKD
scheme, similar to those in Refs. [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
PNS: photon number splitter; Dm (m = 1, 2, 3, 4) are four
single-photon detectors. UB and UC are the operations done
by Bob and Charlie, respectively.
We use the same structure of the network as those in
Refs. [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] in the present MUQKD
network protocol, i.e., its subsystem (a cell of the QKD
network) can be simplified to three parts, the server (Al-
ice), the sender (Bob) and the receiver (Charlie). All the
cells build up a practical network. A MUQKD scheme
is explicit if the principle of its subsystem is described
clearly [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
A subsystem in our MUQKD scheme is shown in Fig.1.
Alice provides the service for preparing and measuring
the polarized d-dimensional single photon T . For a d-
dimensional single photon, we can choose two nonorthog-
onal MBs as Zd and Xd [22]. The MB Zd which has d
eigenvectors can be written as:
|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉 , · · · , |d− 1〉 . (1)
The d eigenvectors of the MB Xd can be described as
|0〉x = 1√
d
(|0〉+ |1〉 + · · · + |d− 1〉) ,
|1〉x = 1√
d
(
|0〉+ e 2piid |1〉+ · · ·+ e
(d−1)2pii
d |d− 1〉
)
,
|2〉x = 1√
d
(
|0〉+ e 4piid |1〉+ · · ·+ e
(d−1)4pii
d |d− 1〉
)
,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
|d− 1〉x = 1√
d
(|0〉+ e
2(d−1)pii
d |1〉+ e
2×2(d−1)pii
d |2〉+ · · ·
+e
(d−1)×2(d−1)pii
d |d− 1〉). (2)
The two vectors |k〉 and |l〉x coming from two MBs sat-
isfy the relation |〈k|l〉x|2 = 1d . We can use the unitary
operation Uj (j = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1) to transfer the state |0〉
into another state |j〉, i.e., Uj |0〉 = |j〉.
Uj = |j〉〈0|. (3)
Moreover, the d-dimensional Hadamard (Hd) operation
can transfer an eigenvector of the MB Zd into that of the
MB Xd, i.e., Hd|j〉 = |j〉x. Here [22]
Hd =
1√
d


1 1 · · · 1
1 e2pii/d · · · e(d−1)2pii/d
1 e4pii/d · · · e(d−1)4pii/d
...
... · · · ...
1 e2(d−1)pii/d · · · e(d−1)2(d−1)pii/d


. (4)
For simplifying the process of error rate analysis, the
traveling single photon T is prepared by the server Al-
ice initially in the state |0〉z = |0〉 in each round. That
is, all the users including the server Alice agree that the
original state of the traveling single photon T is |0〉. Al-
ice sends the photon T to the sender Bob. Bob chooses
two modes, the checking-eavesdropping mode and the
message-coding mode, for the photon received with the
probabilities 1 − Pbm and Pbm, respectively, similar to
Refs. [23]. When he chooses the checking-eavesdropping
mode, Bob measures the photon with the MB Zd. When
he chooses the message-coding mode, Bob codes the pho-
ton T by choosing randomly one of the d unitary oper-
ations {Uj}, say UB. Moreover, Bob should exploit a
nonorthogonal-coding technique (i.e., decoy-photon tech-
nique) to determine whether an eavesdropper is monitor-
ing the quantum line between the two users. That is,
Bob should replace the photon T with a decoy one in
a nonorthogonal state by using a probability Pd (<
1
2 )
before he sends it to the receiver Charlie. In detail, he
can prepare the decoy photon by performing a Hd opera-
tion on the traveling photon T after coding it with one of
the unitary operations {Uj} randomly (The decoy pho-
ton in this scheme is different from the decoy state in Ref.
[24]. It is just a photon in a nonorthogonal state, com-
pared with its original state, not the faint pulses with
different intensities.). In this way, the decoy photon is
randomly in one of the d states {|0〉x, |1〉x, · · · , |d− 1〉x}.
After receiving the photon T , Charlie operates it sim-
ilar to Bob. That is, Charlie performs the operation
UC ∈ {Umn = |m〉〈n|; m,n = 0, 1, · · · , d − 1} on the
photon and then sends it to the server Alice if Charlie
chooses the message-coding mode, otherwise he measures
the photon with one of the two MBs Zd and Xd by using
the probabilities Pcz and Pcx, respectively. If Alice re-
ceived the photon T , she measures it with the MB Zd and
publishes the difference between its original state and the
final one. After Bob deletes the results coming from the
decoy photons measured by Alice, Charlie can obtain the
outcomes UA = UB ⊗ UC .
3For preventing the eavesdropper from stealing the in-
formation about the operations UB done by Bob with a
multi-photon signal [25], Bob should check the number
of the photons in each signal. That is, Bob should anal-
yse the probability that the case in which there are more
than one photon in the signal takes place. This task can
be completed by sampling a subset of signals randomly
and measuring them with two single-photon detectors af-
ter splitting them with a photon number splitter (PNS),
see Fig.1. In fact, the check done by Bob is just used
to determine whether the untrustworthy server Alice in-
serts a Trojan horse in the original signal. Certainly, Bob
should use a special filter (just the photons with the spe-
cial frequency can penetrate it [4]) to filtrate the light
from background or a fake signal [26] before he operates
the photons. The receiver Charlie should also do the op-
eration same as Bob to prevent Alice from eavesdropping
with a Trojan horse attack.
With the decoy photons and PNSs, Bob and Charlie
can check the security of their quantum communication
by analyzing a large enough subset of the results. As the
initial state of the photons is |0〉, the analysis of the error
rate done by Bob an Charlie does not need the help of the
server Alice. Bob and Charlie can check eavesdropping
efficiently with a refined error analysis technique same
as that in Ref. [9]. Thus this MUQKD protocol can be
made to be secure.
Now let us discuss several issues. Firstly, the require-
ment that the travelling photon T is initially in the state
|0〉 is useful for improving the security of this MUQKD
protocol against dishonest servers. If the photon T is ran-
domly in one of the states {|j〉}, the error rate analysis
of the samples transmitted from Bob to Charlie needs
the help of the server Alice. In this way, Alice can
eavesdrop the operations done by Bob and Charlie fully
and freely, and hide her attack with a cheat. We use
the case with a two-dimensional polarized single pho-
ton to describe the principle of this attack. In detail,
we assume that the state of the photon T is |ψ′〉T ∈
{|0〉, |1|, | + x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), | − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)}.
Alice intercepts the photon T after it is operated by
the sender Bob, and stores it. She sends one photon
in an EPR pair in the state |ψ−〉AB = 1√2 (|01〉− |10〉)AB
to Charlie, say the photon B, instead of the original
one T . If Charlie chooses the message-coding mode on
the photon B, Alice measures the photon T with the
MB Z and performs a Bell-basis measurement on the
EPR pair. Obviously, she can obtain all the information
about the operations UB and UC because Charlie only
chooses one of the two operations U0 = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|
and U1 = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0| which make the EPR pair in
the states |ψ−〉AB and |φ−〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 − |11〉)AB, re-
spectively. If Charlie chooses the checking-eavesdropping
mode, Alice performs a Bell-basis measurement on the
photons A and T . It is well known that the state of
the photon B measured by Charlie is correlated to the
results of the Bell-basis measurements [27]. That is, if
the results are |ψ−〉AT , |ψ+〉AT , |φ−〉AT and |φ+〉AT , Al-
ice needs only publish a fake information about the initial
state of the photon T after the unitary operations I = U0,
σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, σx = U1 and iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|,
respectively [27]. Here |ψ+〉AT = 1√2 (|01〉 + |10〉)AT
and |φ+〉AT = 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉)AT . Fortunately, in our
MUQKD protocol, the users can accomplish the error
rate analysis without the help of the server, which makes
the attack invalid.
Secondly, different from Ref. [9], Charlie can choose
the MB Xd with a large probability when he chooses the
checking-eavesdropping mode for obtaining more corre-
lated outcomes. For the symmetry, we assume that the
outcome useful obtained with the MB Zd is equal to that
with the MB Xd, i.e.,
(1− pd)PbmPcmPcz = PdPbmPcmPcx, (5)
where Pbm and Pcm are the probabilities that Bob and
Charlie choose the message-coding mode, respectively;
Pcz and Pcx = 1− Pcz are the probabilities that Charlie
measures his samples with the MB Zd and Xd, respec-
tively. That is, when Pcz = Pd, the probability that Bob
and Charlie obtain the correlated outcomes of the sam-
ples approaches the maximal value Peu = 2(1− Pd)Pd.
Thirdly, let us discuss the case that our MUQKD pro-
tocol is implemented with a practical faint laser pulse.
The probability that there are n photons in a pulse fol-
lows the Poisson statistics [4],
P (n, µ) =
µn
n!
e−µ (6)
where n is the number of photons in a coherent state and
µ = 〈n〉 is the mean photon number. Then the probabili-
ties that a non-empty weak coherent pulse contains more
than one photon is [4]
P (n > 1|n > 0, µ) = 1− P (0, µ)− P (1, µ)
1− P (0, µ)
=
1− (1 + µ)e−µ
1− e−µ
∼= µ
2
. (7)
If µ = 0.05, the probabilities P (n > 1|n > 0, µ = 0.05) ≈
2.5%. That is, when the Fock states are attenuated to
one photon per 20 pulses, the probability that there are
more than one photon in a pulse is about 2.5%.
The instances with more than one photons in a pulse
will decrease the security of this MUQKD protocol. The
reason is that the dishonest server can split one photon
from the multi-photon pulse operated by Bob and mea-
sure it with the MB Zd. In this way, Alice can get all
the useful information about the operation UB. With
the outcome UA, she can obtain the private key fully and
freely. In order to prevent Alice from stealing the infor-
mation with PNS attack, the probability Pcu that the
receiver Charlie obtains an useful outcome when he mea-
sures a sample photon run from Bob is by far larger than
the probability P (n > 1|n > 0, µ = 0.05), i.e.,
Pcu = ηoptηd ≫ P (n > 1|n > 0, µ = 0.05) = 2.5%, (8)
4where ηopt and ηd are the efficiency of the transmission on
a fibre and that of a detector, respectively. Otherwise,
Alice can steal some of the information about the key
with a better quantum channel. In detail, Alice, on one
hand, intercepts all the single-photon pulse and discards
them. On other hand, she splits the multi-photon sig-
nal with some PNSs and sends one of the photons in the
pulse to Charlie with a nearly ideal channel in which the
loss is very low. Obviously, her eavesdropping does not
introduce errors in the outcomes of the samples chosen by
Charlie. Moreover, the loss of the signal is compensated
with a good channel. Thus Bob and Charlie cannot de-
tect Alice’s vicious action. But the story is changed when
Pcu ≫ P (n > 1|n > 0, µ = 0.05). In this time, Bob and
Charlie can monitor the number of the photons in each
signal by sampling some pulses randomly and measur-
ing them after splitting with some PNSs. On the other
hand, Bob and Charlie can exploit privacy amplification
to distil a short key privately [4].
Compared with the MUQKD protocols existing [13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], this one requires the users on the
network to have the capability of measuring single pho-
tons and unitary operations, not Bell-basis measurement
and quantum memory, which makes it more convenient
in application. Moreover, the efficiency for qubits ηq ap-
proaches 100% as almost all the photons can be used to
generating the private key but those for checking eaves-
dropping (its number is negligible). The total efficiency
ηt ≡ quqt+bt also approaches the maximal value 50% as Al-
ice need only publish one bit of classical information for
each useful qubit, i.e., qu = qt = bt = 1. Although the
technique for splitting some photons is in developing [4],
the users can use photon beam splitter (PBS) to replace
PNS for determining the probability that there are more
than one photon in each signal.
In summary, we have presented a MUQKD network
protocol without entanglement and quantum memory.
The users on the network exploit some unitary opera-
tions to code their information on a travelling photon.
As the initial state of the photon prepared by the server
is |0〉, the sender can perform a Hadamard operation on
the photon operated to produce a decoy one which is used
to forbid the dishonest server to eavesdrop freely. With
some PNSs, this MUQKD network protocol can be made
to be secure. The efficiency for qubits and the total effi-
ciency both approach the maximal values, and then this
protocol is an optimal one. Moreover, we discuss the case
with a faint laser pules.
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